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SUMMARY: 1. Introduction.— 2. Background and overview of the ILC Draft 
Articles: A) Background of the ILC work on international watercourses; B) Survey 
of the Draft Articles adopted in 1994 by the ILC.— 3. The scope of the Draft 
Articles: A) The definition of international watercourse; B) The problem of 
transboundary confined groundwaters.— 4. The general principles: A) The prin-
ciple of equitable utilization; B) The obligation not to cause significant harm; 
C) The relationship between the equitable utilization and the duty not to cause 
significant harm.— 5. The protection of international watercourses: A) Protection 
and preservation of ecosystems; B) Prevention, reduction and control of 
pollution.— 6. Conclusions. 
1.— The utilization by States of the waters flowing in rivers which 
cross or border their respective territories raises complicated legal questions. In 
the not so distant past, riparian States kept rigid attitudes influenced by their 
geographical position on a shared watercourse: upstream States claimed 
absolute freedom to utilize transboundary waters regardless of the needs of 
downstream countries (absolute sovereignty theory), while the latters claimed 
the right to receive the unaffected natural flow of waters coming from upper 
countries (absolute territorial integrity theory) 1 . The first legal question, 
therefore, is to reconcile such absolute claims while allocating a quantity of 
1. On the absolute sovereignty and territorial integrity theories, see B E R B E R , 
Rivers in International Law, London, 1959, p. 11 ff.; CAFLISCH, Regles genérales 
du droit des cours d'eau internationaux, in Recueil des Cours, VII, 1989, p. 48-61; 
B R U H Á C S , The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
Dordrecht, 1993, p. 41-48. For a survey of the disputes involving States riparian 
of international watercourses, see M C C A F F R E Y , Water, Politics and International 
Law, in G L E I C K (ed.), Water in Crisis - A Guide to the World's Fresh Water 
Resources, Oxford, 1993, p. 92 ff. 
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water to each riparian State. Secondly, since the pollution of transboundary 
waters increases at the same rate as their intensive and multi-purpose 
economic exploitation, there is a problem of preserving the quality of the 
waters and related ecosystems 2. 
In the absence of specific agreements among riparian States, general 
principles and rules of international law are called upon to solve these 
questions. In order to clarify such rules, the General Assembly in its 
resolution 2669(XXV) of 8 December 1970 recommended the International 
Law Commission (hereinafter "ILC" or "the Commission") to "take up the 
study of the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses 
with a view to its progressive development and codification" 3. In 1994, after 
more than twenty years of work, the ILC completed its task with the adoption 
on second reading of a complete set of thirty-three draft articles on the topic. 
The Commission submitted the draft to the General Assembly, recommending 
the elaboration of a convention by the Assembly itself or by an international 
Conference of plenipotentiaries of States 4. 
The purpose of the present paper is to analyze and comment on some 
selected issues dealt with in the ILC draft articles. Before engaging in the 
analysis, a brief consideration of the background of the ILC work on 
international watercourses and an overview of the draft finally adopted in 1994 
is provided. 
2.— A) In 1971, following the General Assembly resolution 2996 
(XXV), the topic of international watercourses was included in the ILC general 
2. On the problem of pollution of international watercourses see G A J A , River 
Pollution in International Law, in A C A D É M I E D E DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA H A Y E , 
La Protection de lenvironnement et le droit international - Collogue 1973, p. 353 
ff.; SETTE-CAMARA, Pollution of International Rivers, in Recueil des Cours, III, 
1984, p. 125 ff.; L A M M E R S , Pollution of International Watercourses, The Hague, 
1984; NOLLKAEMPER, The Legal Regime for Transboundary Water Pollution: 
Between Discretion and Constraint, Dordrecht, 1993. 
3. See Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during its Twenty-Fifth 
Session, General Assembly Official Records, 25th Session, Suppl. n. 28 (UN Doc. 
A/8028), p. 127. 
4. The text of the draft articles and of related commentaries, together with the 
recommendation of the ILC, are reproduced in Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, General Assembly Official 
Records, 49th Session, Suppl. n. 10, (UN Doc. A/49/10), chapter III, p. 195-326. 
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programme of work. At its 1974 session, the Commission set up a sub-
committee to consider the subject. In its report, the sub-committee pointed 
out a number of preliminary issues - such as the scope and the exact meaning 
of the term "international watercourse", the uses of waters to be examined and 
the opportunity to deal with the problem of pollution of international 
watercourses - and proposed that a questionnaire on the issues be conveyed to 
Governments 5 . At its 1976 session, the Commission considered the replies of 
21 governments to the questionnaire 6 , together with the report of the first 
special rapporteur appointed for the topic, Richard D. Kearney. The general 
debate at that session led the Commission to draw the outlines of its future 
study on watercourses. First of all, the Commission decided not to pursue at 
the outset of the work the question of determining the exact scope of the term 
"international watercourse". Secondly, the ILC resolved to devote its attention 
to the formulation of general principles applicable to legal aspects of the uses 
of watercourses. The Commission pointed out, in this regard, that these 
principles should be designed to promote the adoption of regimes for 
individual international rivers and should be of a residual character. Thirdly, 
the Commission agreed to include problems related to pollution of interna-
tional watercourses in the study 7. 
During the following years, several changes in the special rapporteurship 
delayed the development of the draft. In 1980, the Commission was able to 
adopt a first group of six articles, proposed by the special rapporteur Stephen 
M. Schwebel, on a provisional basis 8 . Those articles were then withdrawn by 
the subsequent special rapporteur, Jens Evensen, and in 1984 a new set of nine 
articles, dealing with the general principles of the topic, was adopted 9. 
5. The report of the sub-committee is reproduced in Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of its Twenty-Sixth Session, General 
Assembly Official Records, 29th Session, Suppl. n. 10 (UN Doc. A/9610/Rev. 1), 
p. 140-142. 
6. See the text of the questionnaire and the replies of governments in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (hereinafter ILC Yearbook), 1976, 
vol. II, pt. one, p. 149 ff. 
7. For these conclusions of the Commission see Report of the Commission 
on the Work of its Twenty-Eight Session, in ILC Yearbook, 1976, vol. II, pt. two, 
p. 153 ff. (in particular p. 162). 
8. Cf. Report of the Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Second Session, 
in ILC Yearbook, 1980, vol. II, pt. two, p. 110 ff. 
9. Cf. Report of the Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Sixth Session, in 
ILC Yearbook, 1984, vol. II, pt. two, p. 89 ff. 
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In 1985, the appointment of the new special rapporteur, Stephen C. 
McCaffrey, opened the way to a period of continuity in the study, a factor 
which led the Commission, during its session of 1991, to adopt on first 
reading a set of thirty-two art icles 1 0 . At the same session the Commission 
decided to send the draft articles to governments, to elicit their comments and 
observations. 
The consideration of the topic was resumed at the 1993 session. In the 
light of the comments received from 21 governments 1 1 and under the guidance 
of the newly appointed special rapporteur, Robert Rosenstock, the 
Commission made the necessary adjustments to the first reading, and at its 
1994 session, adopted the second reading of the draft. 
B) The draft articles adopted by ILC on second reading are similar in 
most respects to those approved in 1991. A significant change, apart from the 
redrafting of some provisions, is the addition of a new article 33 on settlement 
of disputes; moreover, a resolution on transboundary confined groundwater is 
annexed to the draft. On the whole, the draft is conceived as a framework 
instrument, setting forth general principles and rules that may be applied and 
adjusted by specific agreements among States sharing individual international 
watercourses. 
In terms of structure, the thirty-three draft articles are organized in six 
parts or chapters. Part I, the Introduction, contains four articles devoted to the 
scope of the project (Art. 1), the use of terms (Art. 2), the application of the 
project to individual watercourses through specific watercourse agreements 
(Art. 3) and the position of riparian States in respect to watercourse 
agreements (Art. 4). Part II of the draft includes the general principles of the 
subject: the rule of equitable and reasonable utilization (Art. 5), the list of 
factors relevant to equitable utilization (Art. 6), the obligation not to cause 
significant harm to other watercourse States (Art. 7), the general obligation to 
cooperate with other watercourse States (Art. 8), the duty to exchange data and 
information concerning a shared watercourse on a regular basis (Art. 9) and the 
principle that no use enjoys inherent priority over other uses (Art. 10). Part 
III, entitled "Planned Measures", contains articles 11 to 19, which specify the 
10. See the text of the articles adopted on first reading in Report of the 
Commission on the Work of its Forty-Third Session, in ILC Yearbook, 1991, vol. 
II, pt. two, p. 66-70. 
1 1. Cf. Comments and Observations Received from States, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/447 and Addenda 1, 2 and 3. 
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obligations of prior notification and consultation that bind riparian States in 
case of projected new uses of an international watercourse. Part IV includes 
seven articles, dealing respectively with the protection and preservation of 
ecosystems related to international watercourses (Art. 20), the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution (Art. 21), the introduction of new species in 
an international watercourse (Art. 22), the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment (Art. 23), the joint management and the regulation of 
international watercourses (Arts. 24 and 25) and the maintenance and security 
of installations related thereto (Art. 26). Part V contains only two articles, 
devoted to the prevention and mitigation of harmful conditions resulting from 
natural causes or human conduct, such as floods, siltation, erosions, etc., and 
to the obligations of riparian States in emergency situations (Arts. 27 and 28). 
Part VI of the draft gathers, under the title of "Miscellaneous Provisions", a 
number of unrelated provisions on different subjects: protection of water-
courses and related installations in times of armed conflict (Art. 29), indirect 
procedures of notification and consultation among watercourse States (Art. 
30), data and information concerning watercourses vital to national security of 
riparian States (Art. 31), non-discrimination with regard to access to judicial 
or administrative procedures (Art. 32) and settlement of disputes (Art. 33). 
In the following, selected aspectes of the draft articles will be discussed: 
the meaning of "international watercourse"; the two general principles of 
equitable utilization and prohibition to cause harm; and the question of the 
protection of watercourses and related ecosystems against pollution. 
3 .— A) The first aspect of the draft articles that deserves attention is the 
definition of the concept of international watercourse. This is of primary 
importance, since the scope of the constraints posed on States in the 
utilization of water resources located in their territories depends on the exact 
delimitation of the term "watercourse". 
The central issue seems to be the determination of the components that 
form a watercourse and that, consequently, are subject to international regime. 
Generally speaking, States are not inclined towards broad interpretations of the 
term watercourse, or one that includes such hydrological components as 
tributaries, lakes, underground aquifers, glaciers, etc. which, although distinct 
from the main stem of a river, are connected with i t . 
On the other hand, it must be kept in mind that, due to the physical 
nature of water and its constant movement in streams, the different compo-
nents of a watercourse listed above are integrally connected. As a consequence, 
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the negative impact of human activities in one part of a watercourse located 
within the territory of a particular State can spread and be perceived at other 
points of the same watercourse, located in the territories of other riparian 
Sta tes 1 2 . Therefore, the physical and hydrological unity of a watercourse must 
be considered by States in order to ensure the optimal management and the 
adequate protection of the watercourse itself. 
These conflicting considerations emerged dramatically in 1974, when the 
Commission circulated a questionnaire to governments addressing the two 
questions of the scope of the definition of "international watercourse" and 
whether this definition should be based on the concept of "drainage basin". 
The drainage basin concept, elaborated mainly in the Helsinki Rules on the 
Use of Waters of International Rivers, adopted by the International Law Asso-
ciation in 1966, refers to the entire geographic area (known as "watershed") in 
which all the sources, both surface and underground, that provide water to the 
main river are situated 1 3 . 
The replies of the governments to these questions revealed a sharp divi-
sion of opinions. In particular, the issue of the term "drainage basin" being 
used in the draft articles proved to be highly controversial. Certain countries 
(generally downstream) pronounced themselves in favour of that notion, 
arguing that the drainage basin would provide a sound conceptual basis for 
dealing with the hydrographic coherence of a watercourse, and would reflect the 
legal relevance of the interdependence among its various components 1 4 . 
On the other hand, some upstream States strongly opposed the inclusion 
of the term drainage basin in the draft articles, fearing that the geographical 
implications involved in that concept could open the way to undue restrictions 
on the sovereignty of States in freely disposing of the land areas through 
which an international river flows15. The same States favoured the inclusion 
of a narrower approach based on the "traditional" definition of international 
watercourse, which appears in some ancient treaties on river navigation. This 
1 2 . See, for these considerations, SCHWEBEL, First Report on the Law of the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, in ILC Yearbook, 1979 , 
vol. II, pt. one, p. 146 ff. 
1 3 . See Art. II of the Helsinki Rules in INTERNATIONAL L A W ASSOCIATION, 
Report of the Fifty-Second Conference, Helsinki, 1996 , p. 4 8 4 - 4 8 5 . 
1 4 . See in particular the replies of Argentina, Finland, United States, in ILC 
Yearbook, 1976, vol. II, pt. one, p. 152, 154 and 160. 
1 5 . See for example the comments of Brazil, Ecuador and Spain, ibidem, p. 
1 5 2 - 1 5 3 , 154, 1 5 9 - 1 6 0 . 
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definition limits the concept of international watercourse to the main surface 
water channel of a river that crosses or borders the territories of different 
States, and is intended to exclude not only tributaries, but also other hydro-
graphic components such as groundwater 1 6. 
The same difference of views emerged among the members of the I L C 1 7 . 
In the absence of a consensus over the definition of international watercourse, 
and in order not to compromise the advancement of the draft articles, the 
Commission decided to defer the consideration of the question of the use of 
terms to a later stage of its work. 
The Commission was able to agree on a definition of international 
watercourse only at its 1991 session, at the time of the adoption of the entire 
first reading of the draft ar t icles 1 8 . The same definition appears, with slight 
modifications, in the second reading of the draft, adopted in 1994. According 
to Art. 2 of this draft, an international watercourse is "a watercourse, parts of 
which are situated in different States", and a watercourse is further defined as "a 
system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their 
physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common 
terminus" 1 9 . 
The definition in Art. 2 is based on the watercourse as a hydrologic 
system formed by a number of different components, both surface and 
underground, through which water flows. Hence, as long as these elements are 
physically interrelated, they form part of a watercourse. Moreover, the system 
16. The traditional definition of international river is deduced from Art. 108 
of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna of 1815, which provides that "The 
Powers whose States are separated, or crossed by the same navigable river, engage 
to regulate, by common consent, all that regards its navigation" (text reprinted in 
CAPONERA (ed.), The Law of International Water Resources, FAO Legislative Study 
n. 23, Rome, 1980, p. 29 - emphasis added). 
17. See the summary records of the debates held during the 1976 session of 
the Commission, in ILC Yearbook, 1974, vol. I, p. 286-283. For more details on 
the various positions expressed in the ILC and in the Sixth Committee of the 
General Assembly on the questions of the definition of international watercourse, 
see W E S C O A T , Beyond the River Basin: The Changing Geography of International 
Watercourse Law, in Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and 
Policy, 1992, p. 301 ff. 
18. See Report of the Commission on the Work of its Forty-Third Session, in 
ILC Yearbook, 1991, vol. II, pt. two, p. 63-66. See also Mc CAFFREY, Seventh 
Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, in 
ILC Yearbook, 1991, vol. II, pt. one, p. 49 ff. 
19. See UN Doc. A/49/10 cit, p. 199. 
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of surface and underground waters must normally flow into a "common 
terminus". The "common terminus" requirement is intended to prevent that, 
for example, two different river basins connected by an artificial canal can be 
considered as a single watercourse for the purpose of the draft articles. This 
way, a limitation is introduced in the geographic scope of the draft art icles 2 0 . 
As a whole, the definition included in draft Art. 2 appears as a viable 
compromise between the two conceptual interpretations of the meaning of 
international watercourse described above. On the one hand, the concept of 
hydrological system helps to overcome the limits of the traditional definition 
of international watercourse, making it clear that a watercourse is not merely 
"a pipe carrying water", but a complex hydrological reality whose components 
are relevant for the purposes of international legal regulation. On the other 
hand, the description of watercourse as a system of water components helps to 
avoid the "territorial" implications of the concept of drainage basin, sug-
gesting that the draft articles apply only to international water resources of 
States and not to their land territories. 
In fact, some doubts remains as to the extent to which the activities of 
States on land could be totally ignored or excluded from the scope of a legal 
regime governing the utilization of international watercourses. Such doubts 
are justifiable considering that certain land-use activities could affect the 
natural conditions of a watercourse (i.e. deforestation) 2 1, or cause the indirect 
pollution of its waters (i.e. the dumping of toxic wastes onto the l a n d ) 2 2 . In 
order to deal with these problems, it seems appropriate to adopt a wider notion 
of international watercourse. In this respect, it is interesting to note that in 
some recent international conventions riparian States have used terms as "river 
20. See the commentary of the Commission to Art. 2, ibidem, p. 200-201. 
2 1 . See M C C A F F R E Y , Fifth Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses, in ILC Yearbook, 1989, vol.11, pt. one, p. 93-97; 
B A N K E S , International Watercourse Law and Forests, in CANADIAN COUNCIL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (ed.), Global Forests and International Environmental Law, 
Dordrecht, 1996, p. 137 ff.; 
22. Cf. M C C A F F R E Y , Seventh Report cit., p. 59, para. 56 (especially footnote 
97). The concept of "basin" appears particularly suitable in dealing with the 
problems of cross media-pollution: see H O H M A N N , Cross-Media Pollution and 
International Environmental Law, in Natural Resources Journal, 1994, p. 536-
539. See also the Draft Articles on the Relationship between Water, Other Natural 
Resources and the Environment, adopted in 1980 by the International Law 
Association, in I N T E R N A T I O N A L LAW A S S O C I A T I O N , Report of the Fifty-Ninth 
Conference, Belgrade, 1980, p. 373 ff. 
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basin" or "catchment area" to define the scope of the obligations they have 
assumed to ensure the adequate protection of their shared watercourses 2 3. 
Be that as it may, the definition finally elaborated by the ILC probably 
represents a positive achievement in terms of its being acceptable to States. 
This conclusion seems corroborated by the support for Art. 2 of the draft 
expressed by State delegates during the 1994 session of the Sixth 
Commit tee 2 4 . 
B) A more specific problem raised by draft Art. 2 is whether it covers 
all transboundary groundwaters. The definition of international watercourse as 
a system of water components constituting a unitary whole by virtue of their 
physical relationship entails as a consequence that groundwaters are part of the 
system only to the extent that they interact (are physically linked) with the 
surface waters forming a watercourse. As a result, the so-called "confined 
groundwaters", that is underground aquifers with no relationship with surface 
waters, are excluded from the definition of "international watercourse" 
embodied in draft Art. 2. 
Despite the ILC unwillingness to include confined groundwaters in the 
scope of the draft articles adopted in the first reading in 1991, the special 
rapporteur Rosenstock suggested that the question be reconsidered during the 
examination of the second reading of the draf t 2 5 . Finally, the Commission 
decided to annex a resolution on transboundary confined groundwaters to the 
23. See for example Art. 1 of the Agreement on the Cooperation for the 
Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube (Sofia, 20 June 1994 - text in 
B u R H E N N E , International Environmental Law - Multilateral Agreements, 
994:49/1), where the terms "catchment area" and "hydrological river basin" 
appear; Arts. 1 and 3 of the twin Conventions for the Protection of the River 
Meuse and the River Scheldt (Charleville Meziers, 26 april 1994 - text in 
International Legal Materials, 1995, p. 854 and 859), where the terms "river 
basin" and "drainage area" are used. See also the 1992 Helsinki Convention on the 
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (text in 
International Legal Materials, 1992, p. 1312): although Art. 1 of this Convention 
contains the definition of "Transboundary waters", Art. 9 further provides that "... 
Riparian Parties shall specify the catchment areas, or part(s) thereof, subject to 
cooperation" (emphasis added). 
24. See Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee of 
the General Assembly during its Forty-Ninth Session [1994], UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/464/Add.l, p. 46-47. 
25. Cf. ROSENSTOCK, First Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses, UN Doc A/CN.4/451, p. 5-6. 
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second reading of the draft articles. In this resolution the Commission, 
recognizing "the need for continuing efforts to elaborate rules pertaining to 
confined transboundary groundwaters", recommends States "to be guided by 
the principles contained in the draft articles on the law of the non-navigational 
uses of international watercourses, where appropriate, in regulating confined 
transboundary groundwaters" 2 6. 
The intermediate course taken by the Commission in 1994 may have 
resulted partly from the lack of a proper understanding of the physical features 
of confined groundwaters and of their interconnections with surface waters. 
More realistically, the Commission's choice was also influenced by its wish 
not to extend excessively the scope of the draft articles 2 7 . Be that as it may, it 
seems odd, however, that a draft, of which the main purpose is to establish a 
comprehensive legal framework for the utilization of international water 
resources, excludes from its application an important category of underground 
aquifers. This result is even more unfortunate if one considers the recent trends 
in the field of water management, as expressed by various international 
instruments, such as the Agenda 21 adopted at the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development 2 8 . These instruments consider 
the integrated management and planning of all types of water resources, 
including groundwaters, as the most adequate way to attain their proper 
utilization and protection 2 9 . 
Moreover, it seems that the general principles that lie at the core of the 
ILC articles - such as the principle of equitable utilization and the obligation 
not to cause harm embodied in draft Arts. 5 and 7 - will also cover the pro-
blems relating to the use and management of confined groundwaters. It is 
worth noting that the same principles are expressly recalled by the recent 
instruments where Israelis and Palestinians addressed the issue of the equitable 
apportionment of the (confined) groundwaters contained in the West Bank 
aquifers 3 0. 
26. Text in UN Doc A/49/10 cit., p. 326. 
27. See Report of the Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Fifth Session, 
in ILC Yearbook, 1993, vol. II, pt. two, p. 88. 
28. See Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 in Report of the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. II), p. 167 ff. 
29. For a thorough assessment of such instruments see ROSENSTOCK, Second 
Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/462, p. 29-33. 
30. See para. 1 of Annex III to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements (Washington, 13 September 1993), where the two 
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Considering these trends of State practice, a further step of the ILC 
towards the explicit inclusion in the draft articles of transboundary confined 
groundwaters would have been welcome. 
4.— Part II of the draft articles codifies the basic rules of customary 
international law governing the utilization of international watercourses: the 
principle of equitable utilization and the duty not to cause significant harm to 
other riparian States. 
A) The first basic rule of international water law obliges riparian 
States to utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable 
manner. This rule stresses the equal and correlative rights of riparian States in 
respect to the use of a shared watercourse. In other words, every riparian State 
is entitled to enjoy, within its territory, a reasonable and equitable share of the 
uses and benefits of an international watercourse, but this entitlement is 
limited by the duty not to deprive other riparian States of their right to 
equitable utilization 3 1 . In the case of conflicting claims to utilization, the 
measure of the rights of each State will be determined by taking into account 
the equity and reasonableness of the respective needs. The latter consideration 
implies that it is impossible to establish in abstracto what is a reasonable and 
Parties agreed to focus their future cooperation on "... the equitable utilization of 
joint water resources... "; See also Art. 40 of Annex III to the Interim Agreement 
on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Washington, 28 September 1995), where the 
Parties, specifying their respective rights and responsibilities in the use and 
management of the West Bank water resources, recalled the following principles: 
"Using the water resources in a manner which will ensure sustainable use in the 
future, in quantity and quality" (para. 3.c); "Taking all the necessary measures to 
prevent any harm to water resources... " (para. 3.e) (both texts reproduced in 
Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, Occasional Document Series, August 
1996, n. 7, p. 254 and 126 respectively). On the question of the sharing of the 
West Bank aquifers, see BENVENISTI & GVIRTZMAN, Harnessing International Law 
to Determine Israeli-Palestinian Water Rights: The Mountain Aquifer, in Natural 
Resources Journal, 1993, p. 543 ff. 
31 . On the general features of the equitable utilization principle see LlPPER, 
Equitable Utilization, in G A R R E T S O N , H A Y T O N & O L M S T E A D (eds.), The Law of 
International Drainage Basins, Dobbs Ferry, 1967, p. 15 ff.; M C C A F F R E Y , Second 
Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, in 
ILC Yearbook, 1986, vol. II, pt. one, p. 110 ff.; S C H W E B E L , Third Report on the 
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, in ILC 
Yearbook, 1982, vol. II, pt. one, p. 75 ff. 
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equitable utilization of an international watercourse. The equitable and 
reasonable utilization of a watercourse will be evaluated case by case, by 
weighing and balancing all factors relevant to the concrete situation, and 
without according to any of such factors an inherent priority over others. 
These general features of the rule of equitable utilization are embodied in 
articles 5, 6 and 10 of the ILC draft. The first of these articles reads as 
follows: 
" 1 . Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an 
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an 
international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a 
view to attaining optimum utilization thereof and benefits therefrom consistent 
with adequate protection of the watercourse. 
2. Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and 
protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. 
Such participation includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to 
cooperate in the protection and the development thereof, as provided in the present 
articles" 3 2 . 
The two paragraphs of draft Art. 5 elaborate upon the principle of 
equitable utilization. Under the first paragraph, the optimum utilization is 
indicated as the goal to be sought by riparian States in their utilization of an 
international watercourse; under the second paragraph, riparian States are called 
to cooperate and participate on an equal basis in the attainment of that goal. 
In its commentary to draft Art. 5 the Commission explained that the aim 
of optimum utilization does not mean the achievement of the maximum use 
of the watercourse or the most economically valuable use: rather, it implies 
attaining maximum possible benefits for all riparian States while minimizing 
the detriment to each. Moreover, paragraph one of draft Art. 5 further qualifies 
the goal of optimum utilization, pointing out that the economic exploitation 
of an international watercourse must not be pursued blindly by States, but in a 
manner "consistent with the adequate protection of the watercourse" 3 3 . This 
sentence seems to refer to some of the basic requirements which lie at the core 
of the concept of "sustainable use" of natural and environmental resources, 
that is, a use of such resources that avoids their depletion and meets the needs 
32. Text in U N Doc A/49/10 cit., p. 218. 
33. See the commentary to Art. 5, ibidem, p. 218-219. 
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of the present and future generat ions 3 4 . In fact, although the concept of 
"sustainability" is not explicitly mentioned in the text of Art. 5, the records of 
the 1994 session reveal that certain members of the ILC felt that the objective 
of sustainable use of an international watercourse was adequately covered by 
the final phrase of paragraph one of the ar t ic le 3 5 . Nevertheless, an explicit 
reference to sustainable use in the text of the article would be preferable, in 
order both to reflect the recent trends of international environmental law, and 
to clarify the ambiguous notion of "optimum utilization". 
The concept of equitable participation set forth in the second paragraph of 
Art. 5 represents a development of the principle of equitable utilization 3 6 . The 
second sentence of the paragraph specifies the affirmative nature of equitable 
participation, providing that riparian States have not only a right to use the 
watercourse, but also a duty to cooperate and participate in its protection and 
development. At the time of the adoption of Art. 5, some members of the ILC 
questioned the mandatory implications of the equitable participation concept, 
arguing that States could hardly be obliged to participate in the use of an 
international watercourse 3 7 . The second paragraph of Art. 5 was then adopted 
on the understanding that it must be interpreted not as imposing a strict 
obligation of participation on States, but in the sense that when riparian 
States decide to participate in the use of an international watercourse, they 
3 4 . See the definition of "sustainable use" contained in Art. 2 of the United 
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 1992 - text in 
International Legal Materials, 1992, p. 818) . The principle of "sustainable use" of 
water resources is mentioned in Annex III to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim 
Agreement on West Bank and Gaza Strip of 28 September 1995 (see supra, 
footnote 30) . Art. 2, para. 5 , of the 1994 Sofia Convention on Cooperation for 
the Protection and Sustainable Use of Danube River also refers to "sustainable 
water management" (text in B U R H E N N E , International Environmental Law -
Multilateral Agreements, 994 :49 /013 ) . On the relationship between the optimum 
utilization and sustainable development principles in the field of water resources 
see H A F N E R , The Optimum Utilization and the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, in Austrian Journal of Public and International Law, 
1993, p. 113 ff.; HEY , Sustainable Use of Shared Water Resources: The Need for a 
Paradigmatic Shift in International Watercourse Law, in BLAKE ET AL. (eds), The 
Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources, Dordrecht, 1995, p. 127 ff. 
3 5 . See Summary Records of the Meetings of the Forty-Sixth Session, in ILC 
Yearbook, 1994, vol. I, p. 174-176. 
3 6 . On the concept of equitable participation see S C H W E B E L , Third Report 
cit., p. 85 -86 . 
3 7 . See in particular the doubts expressed by Koroma and Al-Khasawneh at 
the 1987 ILC session, in ILC Yearbook, 1987, vol. I, p. 239 , paras. 3 5 , 37 , 39 , 
4 0 . 
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should do so in an equitable an reasonable manner. In this respect, the 
equitable participation could be intended as the expression of a general 
principle of cooperation instrumental to the realization of the goals spelled out 
in precedent paragraph of the article 3 8 . In fact, the commentary to Art. 5 helps 
to clarify this rather obscure point. It provides that "the core of equitable 
participation is cooperation among riparian States through participation, on an 
equitable and reasonable basis, in measures, works and activities aimed at 
attaining optimal utilization of an international watercourse, consistent with 
adequate protection thereof' 3 9. From this point of view, the second paragraph 
of Art. 5 anticipates the general obligation of cooperation embodied in Art. 8 
of the draft 4 0 . 
As noted above, the rule of equitable utilization is a very general and 
flexible one, and its proper implementation requires taking into account all the 
circumstances pertaining to each single case. To this end, draft Art. 6 provides 
a list of factors that are relevant in determining, in each concrete situation, 
what an equitable and reasonable utilization of the watercourse is. It is 
important to stress that the list contained in Art. 6 is merely indicative and 
non-exhaustive. The list refers to factors of natural, economic and social 
character, such as geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic or ecolo-
gical conditions, the social and economic needs of the watercourse States 
concerned, the population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse 
State, the existing and potential uses of the watercourse, e t c . 4 1 . 
Finally, the first paragraph of draft Art. 10 provides that, in the absence 
of contrary agreements or customs, no use of an international watercourse 
enjoys inherent priority over other uses. This important principle is completed 
by the second paragraph of the article, according to which any conflict 
concerning the uses of an international watercourse will be settled by the 
application of draft articles 5 to 7, "with special regard being given to the 
38. See the declarations of Arangio-Ruiz, Calero Rodriguez and Beesley, 
ibidem, p. 239-240, paras. 41, 43 and 45. 
39. Cf. UN Doc. A/49/10 cit., p. 219-220. 
40. Art. 8 of the draft provides that "Watercourse States shall cooperate on 
the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and mutual benefit in order to 
attain optimal utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse". 
The commentary to the article further explains that "cooperation between 
watercourse States with regard to their utilization of an international watercourse is 
an important basis for the attainment and maintenance of an equitable utilization 
of the uses and benefits of the watercourse" (ibidem, p. 244). 
41 . See the text of Art. 6 in UN Doc A/49/10 cit., p. 231. 
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requirements of human vital needs" 4 2 . The purpose of the latter sentence does 
not seem to derogate from the basic criterion of absence of priority among 
uses. Nevertheless it represents a remarkable statement in favour of the special 
attention that riparian States must pay to providing sufficient water to sustain 
human life when they utilize an international watercourse 4 3 . 
B) The second basic rule of international water law, derived from the 
ancient Latin dictum sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, is the obligation of 
watercourse States to use an international watercourse in such a way as not to 
cause harm to other riparian Sta tes 4 4 . As a negative provision, the "no harm" 
rule sets limitations to the sovereign freedom of States to exploit their water 
resources. But the extent of these limitations on State sovereignty will depend 
on the way in which the "no harm" rule is framed. 
In this connection, a first question is to define the kind of damage 
forbidden by the duty not to cause harm. Of course, the rule does not cover the 
de minimis or trivial harm, but only harm above a certain threshold of 
seriousness. The difficulty lies in ascertaining the threshold above which the 
harmful consequences of the use of an international watercourse become 
legally relevant to the application of the rule, and are therefore prohibited 4 5 . 
A second question pertains to the definition of the obligation embodied 
in the "no harm" rule as one of "conduct" or one of "result", and to the 
standard of responsibility hereby involved. In other words, the issue at stake is 
whether a State may avoid responsibility for causing harm to another riparian 
State by adopting the conduct that could reasonably be expected or required in 
order to prevent the harm; or whether the responsibility of the State is 
42. See the text of Art. 10 ibidem, p. 256. 
43 . On this point see M C C A F F R E Y , / ! Human Right to Water: Domestic and 
International Implications, in Georgetown International Environmental Law 
Review, 1992, p. 17-23. 
44. On the obligation not to cause harm to other riparian States see, in 
general, CAFLISCH, Regles genérales cit., p. 135-141; B R U H Á C S , The Law of Non-
Navigational Uses cit., p. 121-154. 
45. On this problem see S A C H A R I E W , The Definition of the Threshold for 
Transboundary Environmental Injury under International Law: Development and 
Present Status, in Netherlands International Law Review, 1990, p. 193 ff.; J A I N , 
Shared Natural Resources and the Concept of Appreciable or Significant Damage in 
International Law, in Indian Journal of International Law, 1986, p. 138 ff. 
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involved, regardless of the conduct adopted by it, in any case in which the 
prohibited harm has taken p lace 4 6 . 
The attitude of the ILC on these issues has evolved considerably in the 
shift from the 1991 to the 1994 final version of the draft articles. 
Draft Art. 7 included in the first reading was very concise, stating that 
"Watercourse States shall utilize an international watercourse in such a way as 
not to cause appreciable harm to other watercourse States" 4 7 . Notwithstanding 
the fact that the commentary to the article seeks to explain that the qualifier 
"appreciable" embodies a factual as well as an objective standard, the threshold 
envisaged by this term remains rather vague. In fact, "appreciable" could 
indicate any harm that is merely "measurable", with the consequence that the 
threshold of prohibited harm is a very low one. Moreover, the unconditional 
wording of the text seems to envisage a cogent interpretation of the duty not 
to cause harm, conceived in terms of an obligation of result involving the 
strict responsibility of the State that has caused the damage. 
The ambiguities of draft Art. 7 adopted on first reading were criticized by 
a certain number of governments, both during the 1991 session of the Sixth 
(Legal) Committee of the General Assembly and in their written comments to 
the first reading of the draft articles 4 8 . 
Taking into account the criticisms of the governments, and following the 
suggestions of the special rapporteur Rosenstock, the ILC adopted on second 
reading at its 1994 session a thoroughly revised version of Art. 7. The first 
paragraph of the new text is particularly aimed at solving the above mentioned 
shortcomings, and reads as follows: 
46. See M C C A F F R E Y , The Law of International Watercourses: Some Recent 
Developments and Unanswered Questions, in Denver Journal of International Law 
and Policy, 1989, p. 519-525. 
47. See the text and the related commentary in Report of the Commission on 
the Work of its Fortieth Session, in ILC Yearbook, 1988, vol. II, pt. two, p. 35-
41 . 
48. See, for example, the written comments of the Nordic Countries ( U N Doc. 
A/CN.4/447 cit., p. 27), United States (ibidem, p. 40-41) and Canada (UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/447/Add. 1 cit., p. 4) and the declarations of the delegates of Netherlands 
(UN Doc. A/C.6/46/SR.26, p. 7-8), Switzerland {ibidem, p. 10-11) and Turkey (UN 
Doc. A/C.6/46/SR.34, p. 7) in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly. 
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" 1 . Watercourse States shall exercise due diligence to utilize an 
international watercourse in such a way as not to cause significant harm to other 
watercourse States" 4 9 . 
The first relevant innovation is the replacement of the word "appreciable" 
with the word "significant" as a qualifier of the prohibited harm. This change 
is intended to make the threshold of prohibited harm more certain, avoiding 
the dual meaning of the term "appreciable" as both "measurable" and "signifi-
cant". At the same time, in its commentary to the draft articles, the Commis-
sion has pointed out that "significant" is not intended to raise the applicable 
standard: in the ILC understanding, "significant" indicates the harm more than 
simply measurable, but not necessarily "substantial" 5 0 . 
The major innovation contained in the first paragraph of the new Art. 7 
is the reference to the concept of "due diligence" 5 1 . This mention underlies a 
radical change of perspective in the scope of the prohibition to cause harm. 
The "due diligence" obligation contained in the first paragraph of Art. 7 is not 
intended to guarantee that in utilizing an international watercourse significant 
harm would not occur, but that user States perform their best efforts to 
prevent significant harm to other watercourse States. As the ILC makes clear 
in its commentary to the article, what is here involved is "an obligation of 
conduct, not an obligation of resul t" 5 2 . As a consequence, a user State can be 
deemed to have breached its obligation under draft Art. 7 only when it has 
failed to adopt the conduct required, or the measures necessary, to prevent the 
occurrence of the harmful event. This way, the Commission has definitively 
clarified the nature of obligation not to cause significant harm and the standard 
of responsibility required for its breach. 
The introduction of the "due diligence" concept in the new text of Art. 7 
is worthy of appreciation. From a general point of view, this change has the 
merit to bring the ILC draft in line with the trends of State practice in the field 
of use and protection of natural and environmental resources. Indeed, in many 
recent multilateral treaties concluded in this field, States have been ready to 
49. Text in UN Doc. A/49/10 cit, p. 236. 
50. Cf. ibidem, p. 211-212. 
51 . On the concept of "due diligence", see DUPUY, P .M. , La diligence due dans 
le droit international de la responsabilité, in OCDE, Aspects juridiques de la 
pollution transfrontier^ Paris, 1977, p. 396 ff.; PlSILLO-MAZZESCHI, "Due 
diligence" e responsabilitá internazionale degli Stati, Milano, 1989. 
52. See UN Doc. A/49/10 cit. p. 237. 
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accept provisions framed in terms of "due diligence", rather than rules impos-
ing absolute or strict obligations; such provisions call upon States to adopt 
"appropriate efforts", "practical steps" or "best practicable means" directed to 
prevent the harmful effects of their activities on the natural environment 5 3 . 
As far as the utilization of international watercourses is concerned, the 
introduction of the "due diligence" standard in draft Art. 7 has the effect to 
soften the impact of the "no harm" rule, making its application more flexible 
and more consistent with the requirements of the principle of equitable 
utilization 5 4 . The latter consideration leads us to deal with the delicate 
problem of the relationship between the two general principles contained in 
the ILC draft articles, as it will be described in more details in the next sub-
section. 
C) A very delicate issue related to the two principles of "equitable 
utilization" and "no harm" is how they can be reconciled or which of them 
prevails in case of conflict. In fact, the possibility of such a conflict is not a 
remote one. Suppose an upstream State X is planning to build a dam on an 
international watercourse, whose effect is to deprive the downstream State Y 
of a share of the waters used by that State for purposes of agricultural irriga-
tion. Since the principle of equitable utilization allows to strike a balance 
between the respective benefits and detriments of user States, State X will 
invoke that principle as the basis for its right to build the dam. State X could 
claim that the detriment caused to State Y is allowable under an equitable and 
reasonable utilization of the watercourse. On the contrary, State Y could 
invoke the strict application of the "no harm" rule, arguing that the building 
of the dam could cause a significant harm to its utilization of the watercourse, 
and therefore must be prohibited. The outcome will be different depending on 
whether priority is accorded to one principle or to the other. If the "no harm" 
5 3 . See for example Art. 2 of the Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Helsinki, 1992 - text in 
International Legal Materials, 1992 , p. 1315) ; Art. 2 of the Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 1991 -
text ibidem, 1 9 9 1 , p. 803 ) ; Arts. 3 and 6 of the Convention on the Transboundary 
Effects of Industrial Accidents (Helsinki, 1992 - text ibidem, 1992 , p. 1 3 3 5 -
1 3 3 6 ) . 
5 4 . Cf. M C C A F F R E Y , The Law of International Watercourses: Present 
Problems, Future Trends, in Kiss & BURHENNE G U I L M I N (eds.), A Law for the 
Environment - Essays in Honour of W.E. Burhenne, Gland and Cambridge, 1994, 
p. 118 . 
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principle prevailed, the upstream State X would not be permitted to build a 
dam that would cause harm to its downstream neighbour. If the equitable 
utilization principle prevailed, the harm to downstream State Y would be one 
factor to be weighed in determining whether the dam is permissible 5 5 . 
The question is even more complicated when the utilization of an 
international watercourse causes the pollution of its waters and the deteriora-
tion of the environment at l a rge 5 6 . In such instances, it is difficult to accept 
the conclusion that the pollution of a watercourse must be tolerated as the 
result of its equitable utilization. In other words, the application of the "no 
harm" rule seems better suited in cases involving pollution or other threats to 
the environment 5 7 . 
The ILC, in adopting the first reading of the draft articles, decided to give 
priority to the prohibition to cause significant harm over the principle of 
equitable utilization. The Commission's understanding at that time was 
to consider every utilization of an international watercourse involving 
appreciable-significant harm to other watercourse States as inherently inequita-
ble and unreasonable and, therefore, prohibited 5 8. 
However, a certain number of States, in their written comments to the 
draft articles adopted on first reading, criticized the choice of the Commission 
as an unbalanced solution, which would have the effect to prevent upstream 
States from undertake any new development of an international watercourse 
that could cause appreciable-significant harm to downstream States 5 9 . 
5 5 . See M C C A F F R E Y , The International Law Commission Adopts Draft 
Articles on International Watercourses, in American Journal of International Law, 
1 9 9 5 , p. 399 . 
5 6 . This issue seems to characterize the current dispute between Slovakia and 
Hungary on the construction of a system of locks on the Danube: for a survey of 
this case see A R C A R I , La controversia tra Slovacchia ed Ungheria circa la 
costruzione di un sistema di dighe sul Danubio, in Rivista Giuridica dell'Ambiente, 
1993 , pp. 9 5 1 ff. 
5 7 . Cf. M C C A F F R E Y , Recent Developments and Unanswered Questions cit., 
p. 5 1 0 . 
5 8 . See the commentary to draft Art. 7 adopted by the ILC on first reading, in 
Report of the Commission on the Work of its Fortieth Session, in ILC Yearbook, 
1988, vol. II, pt. two, p. 36 . 
5 9 . See the references supra, footnote 4 8 . The choice of the Commission to 
give priority to the "no harm" rule in the first reading of the Draft was also 
criticized by various authors: see CAFLISCH, SIC utere tuo ut alienum non laedas: 
Regie prioritaire ou element pour determiner le droit d'utilisation d'un cours d'eau 
international?, in Festschrift für Walter Mutter, Zurich, 1993 , pp. 2 7 ff.; B O U R N E , 
The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Law of International 
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Following these reactions, the special rapporteur Rosenstock, in his first 
report of 1993, proposed a new text of the draft article on the duty not to cause 
harm, in which the order of priority was reverted in favour of the principle of 
equitable utilization. At the same time, the text proposed by Rosenstock 
introduced an exception to the supremacy of the equitable utilization rule in 
cases where the uses of an international watercourse cause significant harm in 
the form of pollution; these uses were in fact presumed to be inequitable and 
unreasonable 6 0. 
During the adoption of the second reading of the draft articles at its 1994 
session, the Commission added a new paragraph to the text of the article on 
the duty no to cause harm, with the intention to clarify the relationship 
between the two general principles. Paragraph 2 of Art. 7 adopted on second 
reading goes as follows: 
"2. Where, despite the exercise of due diligence, significant harm is caused 
to another watercourse State, the State whose use causes the harm shall, in the 
absence of agreement to such use, consult with the State suffering such harm over: 
(a) the extent to which such use is equitable and reasonable taking into 
account the factors listed in article 6; 
(b) the question of ad hoc adjustments to its utilizations, designed to 
eliminate or mitigate any such harm caused, and, where appropriate, the question of 
compensation" 6 1. 
This paragraph must be read in the light of the "due diligence" obligation 
not to cause significant harm to other watercourse States set forth in the first 
paragraph of Art. 7. Paragraph 2 comes into effect only when a significant 
Watercourses: Principles and Planned Measures, in Colorado Journal of Interna-
tional Environmental Law and Policy, 1992, pp. 65 ff.; W O U T E R S , Allocation of 
the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Efforts at Codification 
and the Experience of Canada and the United States, in Canadian Yearbook of 
International Law, 1992, pp. 43 ff. 
60. This is the text proposed by Rosenstock in 1993: "Watercourse States 
shall exercise due diligence to utilize an international watercourse in such a way as 
not to cause significant harm to other watercourse States, absent their agreement, 
except as may be allowable under an equitable and reasonable use of the 
watercourse. A use which cause significant harm in the form of pollution shall be 
presumed to be inequitable and unreasonable use unless there is: (a) a clear showing 
of special circumstances indicating a compelling need for ad hoc adjustment; and 
(b) the absence of any imminent threat to human health and safety" ( R O S E N S T O C K , 
First Report cit., p. 9-11). 
61 . U N Doc. A/49/10 cit. p. 236. 
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harm is caused "despite the exercise of due diligence" by the user State, that is 
when the user State has not breached the obligation of diligent conduct set 
forth in the previous paragraph. The kind of situation envisaged should be one 
in which any question of international responsibility of the user State for 
wrongful act is excluded. In this case, the specific obligations of consultation 
spelled out in paragraph two of Art. 7 apply. 
In first place, under letter (a) of the paragraph, the State causing harm 
must enter into consultation with the victim State regarding the extent to 
which the harmful use is an equitable and reasonable one. This subparagraph 
involves the recognition of the possibility that an harmful use of a water-
course may nevertheless be equitable and reasonable. An important limitation 
to this possibility is spelled out in the relevant part of the commentary, which 
explains that a use entailing significant harm to human health and safety is 
understood to be inherently inequitable and reasonable 6 2 . But, apart from this 
important specification, the precise effects of subparagraph (a) remain rather 
obscure. 
The commentary points out that the burden of the proof in establishing 
that the harmful use is equitable and reasonable lies on the user S t a t e 6 3 . But 
the same commentary does not explain what the consequence of a negative 
finding would be. One may wonder if the user State could even be accredited 
with a diligent conduct in preventing the harmful consequences of its activity 
when it has failed to adequately weigh and apply all the factors relevant to an 
equitable and reasonable utilization of the watercourse. In all events, the 
failure to prove the equitable character of the utilization would amount to a 
breach by the user State of its international obligations, preventing the 
application of the special regime provided for in the second paragraph of Art. 
7 6 4 . 
Some difficulties arise also in the opposite hypothetical case: when the 
user State has been successful in showing proof of equitable utilization. In 
particular, it is not clear whether this State is then released from any further 
62. See ibidem, p. 241-242. 
63. Ibidem. 
64. See the following declaration of Barboza during the 1994 debates in the 
ILC on Art. 7: "Which were the substantive consequences of harm? The State of 
origin had to prove the extent to which the use was equitable and reasonable. The 
burden of proof lay on that State... If that State did not prove it, then no due 
diligence was accredited and one fell back on the case of paragraph 1: breach of an 
obligation of due diligence" (ILC Yearbook, 1994, vol. I, p. 177). 
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obligation, or whether the specific provisions of letter (b) of the second 
paragraph of Art. 7 apply. The more plausible answer is that subparagraph (b) 
applies also in the case of a positive finding on the equitable character of the 
utilization. In that case, the user State is obliged to consult with the victim 
State on the question of ad hoc adjustment aimed to eliminate or mitigate the 
significant harm and on the question of the payment of appropriate 
compensation 6 5 . This interpretation admits the conclusion that the significant 
damage arising out of a diligent use is one of the relevant factors that must be 
weighed in determining an equitable and reasonable utilization of an 
international watercourse. In this connection, the commentary of the ILC 
underlines the important role of the payment of a compensation as "a means 
of balancing the equities in particular cases" 6 6 . 
Incidentally, the analogy should be emphasized between the obligations 
of consultation provided for in subparagraph (b) of Art. 7 and some of the 
basic conclusions reached by the ILC in the context of its work on the topic 
"International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not 
Prohibited by International Law". This topic is intended to cover, in abstracto, 
situations in which States perform on their territories activities that are lawful 
- in the sense that they are not prohibited by international law - but that cause 
significant harm to other Sta tes 6 7 . In these situations, the ILC understanding 
was that the characterization of the harmful activity as lawful and permissible 
must not override the principle that the victim of transboundary harm should 
not be left to bear the entire loss. To ensure this result, the ILC has singled 
out the basic obligation of the State of origin of the harm to negotiate with 
the victim State in order to provide him with adequate compensation or other 
65. M C C A F F R E Y , The International Law Commission Adopts cit., pp. 400-
401; FlTZMAURlCE, The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses - The International Law Commission Completes its Draft, in Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 1995, p. 370-372. 
66. See UN Doc. A/49/10 cit., p. 243. 
67. On the problem of the international liability of States for activities not 
prohibited by international law and on the works of the ILC on the topic see 
BARBOZA, International Liability for the Injurious Consequences of Acts not 
Prohibited by International Law and the Protection of the Environment, in Recueil 
des Cours, III, 1994, p. 295 ff.; P i s i L L O - M A Z Z E S C H I , Le Nazioni Unite e la 
codificazione della responsabilitá per danno ambiéntale, in Rivista Giuridica 
dell'Ambiente, 1996, p. 371 ff.; L E F E B E R , Transboundary Environmental 
Interference and the Origin of State Liability, The Hague, 1996. 
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relief (for example a modification in the operation of the activity so as to 
avoid or minimize future damages) 6 8 . 
The legal reasoning that lies behind the "State Liability" approach may 
also explain the conditions under which a diligent and equitable use of an 
international watercourse remain lawful, in spite of the significant harm 
caused to other riparian States. The introduction of this legal reasoning in the 
law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses represents the 
most significant innovation realized by paragraph 2 (b) of Art. 7 6 9 . 
As a whole, the second paragraph of Art. 7 aims to reconcile the "equi-
table utilization" and "no harm" principles, rather than declaring the suprem-
acy of one term on the other. Unfortunately, the wording of the paragraph is 
not entirely consistent with such intent, and some further clarification is 
needed concerning the way it operates. 
Finally, it may be noted that the second paragraph of Art. 7 does not 
address the question of the relationship between "equitable utilization" and "no 
harm" principles in cases involving pollution. It remains to be seen whether 
the answer to this question can be found in Part IV of the draft articles, 
specially devoted to the protection of international watercourses. 
5.— The obligations of riparian States relating to the protection of 
international watercourses and of their environment are spelled out in four 
articles, included in Part IV of the draft. As articles 22 and 23 deal specifically 
with the issues relating to the introduction of new species in the watercourse 
and of the protection of the marine environment, our attention will focus on 
the more general provisions contained in articles 20 and 21. 
A) Part IV of the draft opens with Art. 20 which states that "Water-
course States shall, individually or jointly, protect and preserve the eco-
systems of international watercourses" 7 0 . 
68. See for these conclusions the report of the Working Group on 
International Liability established by the ILC at its 1996 session, in Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eight Session, General 
Assembly Official Records, 51st Session, Suppl. n. 10, UN Doc. A/51/10, p. 235-
327 (in particular p. 235-236, and 270-272). 
69. See, in this sense, F ITZMAURICE, The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses 
cit., p. 371-372. 
70. Text in UN Doc. A/49/10, p. 280. 
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This article is based on the assumption that an international watercourse 
must be considered not only as an economic resource to be exploited, but also 
as an ecological unit deserving protection. The key concept of this approach is 
the notion of "ecosystem". The term "ecosystem" is defined by the commen-
tary annexed to Art. 20 as "an ecological unit consisting of living and non-
living components that are interdependent and function as a community". As 
in the case of the term "international watercourse", the boundaries of the 
concept of ecosystem are identified by reference to the interrelationship 
(usually observable) among its various components. In this case also, the 
Commission has been careful to avoid any possible "geographical" or 
"territorial" extension of the notion of ecosystem. The term ecosystem was 
preferred in Art. 20, being more precise than "environment"; the ILC believed 
that the latter term could be interpreted too broadly to apply to areas 
surrounding a watercourse that have minimal bearing on the protection and 
preservation of the watercourse itself 7 1. 
As to the content of the undertakings imposed on States by Art. 20, the 
commentary points out that the obligation to "protect" implies that riparian 
States shield the ecosystems related to international watercourses both from 
actual harm and from the threat of future harm. The relevant footnote specifies 
that the obligation to protect ecosystems is "a general application of the 
principle of precautionary act ion" 7 2 . On the other hand, the obligation to 
"preserve" covers the ecosystems that are in pristine or unspoiled conditions, 
and requires riparian States to maintain those ecosystems as much as possible 
in their natural s t a t e 7 3 . What the commentary does not entirely clarify is 
whether the obligation of protection and preservation involves also the duty of 
States to restore the conditions of ecosystems that are currently degraded 7 4 . 
71 . See, for these considerations, ibidem, p. 280-281. 
72. On the precautionary principle see SCOVAZZI, Sul principio precauzionale 
nel diritto internazionale dell'ambiente, in Rivista di Diritto Internazionale, 1992, 
p. 699 ff.; H O H M A N N , Precautionary Legal Duties and Principles of Modern 
International Environmental Law, Dordrecht, 1994; CAMERON & A B O U C H A R , The 
Status of Precautionary Principle in International Law, in FREESTONE & HEY (eds.), 
The Precautionary Principle and International Law, Dordrecht, 1996, p. 29 ff. 
73. UN Doc. A/49/10 cit., p. 282. 
74. See on these points N A N D A , The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses: Draft Articles on Protection and Preservation of 
Ecosystems, Harmful Conditions, and Protection of Water Installations, in 
Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, 1992, p. 183-
185. 
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Be that as it may, the major innovation of Art. 20 is that the application 
of the obligations herein provided is not made dependent on significant harm 
eventually suffered by riparian States. In fact, the obligation of protection set 
forth in Art. 20 goes further than the "no harm" rule codified in Art. 7 of the 
draft, since it implies the taking of protective measures that may be necessary 
even if no pollution harm is caused to other riparian S ta tes 7 5 . What Art. 20 
intends to attain, according to the ILC, is a utilization of international 
watercourses that may be "ecologically sustainable", so that the ecological 
balance of watercourses and the possibility of their future use are not 
compromised. The commentary to Art. 20 is very clear on this point, stating 
that "together, protection and preservation of aquatic ecosystems help to 
ensure their continued viability as life supporting systems, thus providing an 
essential basis for sustainable development" 7 6 . 
As a final remark, it must be noted that the commentary to Art. 20 
points out that the obligation of protection of ecosystems is a specific 
application of the requirement mentioned in Art. 5 of the draft, according to 
which riparian States use and develop an international watercourse in a manner 
consistent with the adequate protection thereof 7 7. On the other hand, the text 
of Art. 20 - in prescribing that States shall "individually or jointly" protect 
and preserve ecosystems - acknowledges the opportunity that riparian States 
cooperate on an equitable basis in the implementation of protective aims. 
These specifications prove that the ILC has conceived the protection of 
ecosystems as an essential factor in the attainment of the equitable and 
reasonable utilization of international watercourses 7 8 . 
B) The problems relating to pollution of international watercourses 
are dealt with in Art. 21 of the d ra f t 7 9 . The first paragraph of the article 
contains the definition of pollution, intended as "any detrimental alteration in 
the composition or quality of the waters of an international watercourse which 
results directly or indirectly from human conduct". This is a neutral and purely 
75. See in this sense M C C A F F R E Y , Recent Developments and Unanswered 
Questions cit. p. 514. 
76. Cf. UN Doc. A/49/10 cit., p. 282. 
77. Ibidem, p. 282-283. 
78. See B R U N N É E & T O O P E , Environmental Security and Freshwater 
Resources: A Case for International Ecosystem Law, in Yearbook of International 
Environmental Law, 1994, p. 64-65. 
79. Text in UN Doc. A/49/10 cit., p. 289. 
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factual definition of pollution; it does not mention either any particular kind 
of pollution or pollutant agents, or the threshold of gravity of the pollution, 
and not even the specific targets or detrimental effects of the pollution (such as 
harm to human health, property or living resources). 
These aspects are defined more precisely in the second paragraph of Art. 
21, that reads as follows: 
"Watercourse States shall, individually or jointly, prevent, reduce and control 
pollution of an international watercourse that may cause significant harm to other 
watercourse States or to their environment, including harm to human health or 
safety, to the use of the waters for any beneficial purpose or to the living resources 
of the watercourse. Watercourse States shall take steps to harmonize their policies 
in this connection". 
The obligation set forth in this paragraph applies to polluting activities 
that cause, or may cause, "significant harm". The commentary explains that 
pollution falling below that threshold might be covered by the provisions of 
Art. 20 of the draft. This apparent limitation is balanced by the second 
paragraph of Art. 21, which prohibits pollution that affects, in the form of 
significant harm, not only the beneficial uses of an international watercourse, 
but also the "environment" at large of the riparian States. According to the 
commentary, the term environment is intended to cover matters such as "the 
living resources of the international watercourse, flora and fauna dependent 
upon the watercourse, and the amenities connected with it", and thus it 
encompasses a broader concept than the term "ecosystem" included in preced-
ing Art. 2 0 8 0 . 
Turning to the content of the obligation set forth in the second paragraph 
of Art. 21, the commentary clarifies that it represents a specific application of 
the general principles spelled out in articles 5 and 7 of the draft. 
In applying the general principle of "no harm" to the case of pollution, 
the ILC has been inspired by two main considerations. The first observation 
was that some international watercourses are already polluted to varying 
degrees, while others are not. The second remark was that State practice shows 
a general willingness to tolerate even significant pollution harm, provided that 
the State of origin is making its best efforts to reduce or control the pollution. 
These arguments convinced the ILC that an absolute requirement to abate the 
existing pollution causing harm could result in undue hardship for riparian 
80. ibidem, p. 293-294. 
28 
CODIFICATION O F T H E L A W O F INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 
States, "especially where the detriment to the watercourse State of origin was 
grossly disproportionate to the benefit that would accrue to the watercourse 
State experiencing the harm" 8 1 . 
As a result, the second paragraph of Art. 21 does not express an absolute 
ban of pollution. Rather, it calls upon riparian States to control or reduce the 
existing forms of pollution and to prevent the new ones. Also in this case, the 
obligation involved is one of "due diligence". Thus, only a failure of the 
polluter State to exercise due diligence in reducing the pollution to an 
acceptable level would entitle the affected State to claim that the polluter State 
has breached its obligation under paragraph two of Art. 21. Moreover, the 
emphasis laid on the need to prevent pollution implies that the principle of 
precautionary action is applicable here, as it is in Art. 20. The commentary 
suggests that the latter principle can provide important guidance in the conduct 
of States, especially when dangerous - e.g. toxic, persistent and bioaccumula-
tive - substances are involved 8 2 . 
On the basis of these considerations, it is now possible to examine a 
problem that had been left unanswered at the end of the preceding section. This 
concerns the relationship between the "equitable utilization" and "no harm" 
principles in case of activities that involve the pollution of international 
watercourses. The question was considered by the ILC at its 1988 session, 
when the special rapporteur McCaffrey presented a set of draft articles dealing 
with the protection of international watercourses. McCaffrey suggested to 
adopt a "no pollution harm" rule not qualified by exceptions in favour of the 
principle of equitable utilization, on the understanding that water uses causing 
pollution must be regarded as being per se inequitable and unreasonable. On 
the other hand, according to the special rapporteur, the possibility of conflict 
between the two general principles could be minimized by the introduction of 
the standard of due diligence in the context of the "no pollution harm" rule. 
McCaffrey noted that the latter concept could introduce certain considerations 
of equity, that lie behind the principle of equitable utilization, in the 
application of the "no harm" ru l e 8 3 . 
8 1 . See, for these considerations, the commentary to Art. 2 1 , ibidem, p. 2 9 1 -
2 9 2 . 
8 2 . Ibidem, p. 295 . 
8 3 . See MCCAFFREY, Fourth Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses, in ILC Yearbook, 1988, vol. II, pt. one, p. 2 4 1 . 
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These arguments were substantially accepted by the ILC in 1 9 8 8 8 4 , and 
led to the adoption of the text of Art. 21 included in the first reading of the 
draft articles 8 5 . In the absence of substantial modifications either to the text or 
the commentary on Art. 21 in the second reading of the draft, it is presumed 
that the same considerations are still valid. 
However, one could wonder whether the general emphasis given to the 
concept of "due diligence" could, by itself, entirely solve the question of the 
conflict between "equitable utilization" and "no harm" in the case of 
pol lut ion 8 6 . In this respect, it is useful to remind that a more explicit answer 
to this question was envisaged in 1993 by the special rapporteur Rosenstock, 
when he introduced a new draft Art. 7 on the duty not to cause harm; that text 
recognized the inequitable and unreasonable character of the uses that cause 
harm in the form of po l lu t ion 8 7 . Unfortunately, this proposal was not 
adequately explored by the Commission. The adoption of such an explicit 
solution may well have eliminated some of the ambiguities that still affect the 
present wording of articles 7 and 21. 
At the end of the review of Art. 21, it is useful to briefly recall its third 
paragraph, which requires riparian States to enter into consultation, at the 
request of any of them, to establish lists of substances, the introduction of 
which into an international watercourse is to be prohibited, limited, investi-
gated or monitored. This paragraph codifies a well-founded State practice, 
confirmed by a great number of international treaties relevant to the protection 
of fresh and marine waters 8 8 . It is stressed here that the existence of lists of 
84. Cf. Report of the Commission on the Work of its Fortieth Session, in 
ILC Yearbook, 1988, vol. II, pt. two, p. 27-30. 
85. Cf. Report of the Commission on the Work of its Forty-Second Session, 
in ILC Yearbook, 1990, vol. II, pt. two, p. 60-63. 
86. See the doubts expressed on this point by B O U R N E , Principles and 
Planned Measures cit., p. 82. 
87. See supra, footnote 60 and accompanying text. 
88. See for example Annexes I and II to the Convention for the Protection of 
the Rhine against Chemical Pollution (Bonn, 1976 - text in B U R H E N N E , 
International Protection of the Environment - Multilateral Treaties, 976:89/1); 
Annex II to the Convention for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube 
River (Sofia, 1994 - text ibidem, 994:49/1); Annexes I and II to the Protocol for 
the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources 
(Athens, 1980 - text ibidem, 980:37/11); Annexes I and II to the Protocol on the 
Protection of the Black Sea Marine Environment against Pollution from Land 
Based Sources (Bucharest, 1992 - text in International Legal Materials, 1993, p. 
1122). 
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such substances, of which the discharge into rivers must be prohibited or 
subjected to special regulation, could provide a useful parameter to assess the 
adherence by riparian States to the "due diligence" obligations set forth in 
articles 21 and 7 of the draft. 
6.— Following their submission to the General Assembly, the draft 
articles adopted on second reading by the ILC were discussed in the Sixth 
Committee in 1994. In general, States reacted positively, praising the text 
finally adopted by the Commission as a balanced document. Interestingly, a 
more thorough look at the summary records reveals that government 
representatives focused their comments especially on the issues reviewed in 
this paper. To this connection, two main points emerged from the 1994 
debates in the Sixth Committee: 
— First, the majority of the delegates agreed that Part II represented 
the core of draft articles. But, apart this unanimous admission, the views on 
the delicate question of the relationship between the articles on equitable 
utilization and the duty not to cause significant harm were divided. While a 
number of representatives welcomed the text of Art. 7 elaborated in the second 
reading by the ILC as a viable solution to strike a balance between the two 
general principles 8 9 , others criticized the unclear meaning of the new version 
of the article and, in particular, the subjective character of the standard of the 
"due diligence" introduced in that article. The same representatives proposed to 
revert to the 1991 version of Art. 7 9 0 . These opposite reactions suggest that 
the solution adopted in the second reading of the draft has not completely 
solved the problem of the coexistence of the two fundamental principles of 
international water law. 
— Second, a large number of representatives in the Sixth Committee 
praised the incorporation into the ILC draft of rules and principles relating to 
89. See the declarations of United States (UN Doc. A/C.6/49/SR.22, p. 14, 
para. 58), Switzerland (ibidem, p. 16, para. 69), Spain (UN Doc. A/C.6/49/SR.23, 
p. 10, para. 54), United Kingdom (UN Doc. A/C.6/49/SR.26, p. 10, para. 48), 
Ethiopia (UN Doc. A/C.6/49/SR.28, p. 3, para. 7). 
90. See the declarations of Greece (UN Doc. A/C.6/49/SR.17, p. 19. para. 
94), Brazil (UN Doc. A/C.6/49/SR.22, p. 17, para. 75), Egypt (UN Doc. 
A/C.6/49/SR.24, p. 8, para. 29), Bangladesh (ibidem, p. 9, para. 34), Venezuela 
(ibidem, p. 10, para. 39), Vietnam (ibidem, p. 11, para. 45). 
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environmental protection. Moreover, some representatives felt that the draft 
articles should include the additional concepts that had been formulated and 
developed in recent international instruments concluded in the field of 
international environmental l a w 9 1 . It was pointed out that, in particular the 
general principles codified in articles 5, 6 and 7, should explicitly mention 
concepts such as "sustainable use", "sustainable development", "environ-
mental impact assessment", "best available technologies", "best envi-
ronmental practices" 9 2 . These suggestions prove that the question of environ-
mental protection is an aspect inherent in any attempt to elaborate legal rules 
governing the economic exploitation of international watercourses. Following 
the general debate on the ILC draft in the Sixth Committee, the General 
Assembly, by its resolution 49/52 of 9 December 1994, decided that, at the 
beginning of the 1996 session, "the Sixth Committee shall convene as a 
working group of the whole... to elaborate a framework convention on the law 
of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses on the basis of the 
draft articles adopted by the International law Commission...". 
The elaboration of a comprehensive legal regime of the utilization of 
international watercourses seems to approach its conclusion. This is an 
important achievement to which the ILC, with its outstanding effort at 
codification developed during more than twenty years, has greatly contributed. 
91 . Cf. the declarations of Finland (UN Doc. A/C.6/49/SR.22, p. 10, para. 
36), Germany (ibidem, p. 14, para. 50), Mexico (UN Doc. A/C.6/49/SR.24, p. 4, 
para. 13), Slovakia (A/C.6/49/SR.27, p. 15, para. 56). 
92. See in particular the remarks of Finland (UN Doc. A/C.6/49/SR.22, p. 11, 
para. 42), Uruguay (UN Doc. A/C.6/49/SR.23, p. 5, para. 19) and Canada (ibidem, 
p. 8, para. 41-42) 
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